The hot topic the past week is Shawn Watson's play-calling at Missouri. No disagreement there.

Like many, I criticized him vigorously. I stand by that assessment.

But after hearing Watson's defenders, it's important to clarify the merits of criticism, and perhaps dispel a few myths.

No reasonable skeptic of Watson suggests that Nebraska should go back to 1992 and run the ball 90 percent of snaps. No sane observer believes Nebraska's offense would be better if it utilized three tight ends every play.

That is how many of Watson's defenders have characterized the critics, spinning the debate by omitting the critical component from last Thursday:

Torrential rain.

Had the weather been different, Watson's plan may have worked. It certainly wouldn't have drawn such ire. But in those conditions, a shotgun, spread-it-out, attack-the-sideline strategy nearly cost Nebraska the game.

The problem was execution, not game plan, Ted Gilmore said Monday. But what good is a game plan if players can't execute it?

If players can't execute, you don't change the script, Gilmore said, you remove the actors.

So in other words, yes, the Huskers stand by their approach.

The backbone of Watson's support goes like this: Nebraska had to throw the ball because Mizzou was loading the box with eight and nine defenders.

For the sake of argument, let's designate the depth of the defensive box as eight yards deep from the line of scrimmage. Let's mark the width of the box as three yards on either side of Nebraska's offensive line.

A study of game tape shows that Missouri put eight or more defenders in the box on just 16 of 67 snaps. And seven of those 16 came on the final drive, when Nebraska was eating clock with eight consecutive running plays.

The Huskers' problem was not Mizzou's insistence on stacking the line of scrimmage.

The problem was that the Tigers recognized very early in the game that they did not need to take linebackers off the field when Nebraska went shotgun with three, four or five receivers (NU used those formations on 49 of 67 snaps).

On nearly every play, Nebraska had at least one slot receiver. Didn't scare Missouri's outside linebackers. They could cover the slots, but still defend the run.

As a result, when Nebraska did try to run from passing formations, it often had to block four defensive linemen and three linebackers with just five linemen. Those slot receivers were basically useless.

So why don't defenses stay with heavy-linebacker looks more often against spread attacks? Typically, a base 4-3 defense leaves a secondary vulnerable against all those receivers.

Not in Columbia, because Lee couldn't connect with those receivers, because of — here we come back to the key part of the argument — the downpour.

Nebraska would've been much wiser to use more tight-end looks. Tight ends wouldn't have hurt the Huskers in the passing game — in fact, they probably would've been more effective in the middle of the field than slot receivers. And when NU opted to run, those tight ends would've had a fighting chance against Missouri's linebackers.

Power formations give an offense another advantage. They entice safeties to cheat toward the line of scrimmage. And when you find a crease — like Roy Helu did on the last drive — you can bust a big one.

Remove Niles Paul's 56-yard touchdown and Nebraska's average gain on 49 snaps in shotgun, three- four- or five-receiver sets was a paltry 1.8 yards. Even with Paul's catch, it was 2.9.

So it wasn't so much Mizzou stacking the box. It was that Mizzou didn't respect those slot receivers and, thus, didn't have to take linebackers off the field. Instead of responding with power sets, Nebraska beat a dead horse.

If big Ndamukong Suh doesn't ride in on his white horse, we're talking even more this week about Shawn Watson.

Contact the writer:

679-9899, dirk.chatelain@owh.com

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